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Abstract
The chapter explains the meaning of firms from the perspective of economic researchers in 
the past to the views of current dates. Traditional model of a firm’s value is linked firmly 
with shareholders’ value. This traditional view is used in finance and in business for many 
years. To enhance a firms’ value, we need to maximize shareholders’ value. According to 
this view, any activities in firms can increase the value of firms if it increases the value of 
the Shareholders. However, traditional concept of shareholders’ value as the explanation 
to firms’ value is challenged by a group of researchers. This group believes that value of 
firms should not be based on just shareholders but should include all groups of stakehold-
ers. After giving some ideas on the meaning of firm, the corporate sustainability value of 
firm in terms of economics and finance is explained.
Keywords: sustainability, performance, stakeholders, firms value
1. Overview of the chapter
In what follows, the author attempts to evaluate the concept of the theory of firm value as 
it has passed through its interpretive history. For example, the earlier stage of the concept 
maintained the interpretation that a firm is merely a legal device through which the pri-
vate business transactions of individuals are maintained and operated. Such a concept has 
dominated business, finance, and economic understanding about a firm’s theory for a long 
time. Furthermore, as we pass through time, many views emerge from business and finance 
academicians who compete to explain what should be the meaning of the term “firm.” This 
chapter is designed to outline to readers the evolution of the terms firm and firm value through 
the lens of academic study in business and finance (or economics perhaps?) through prior 
literature surrounding the issues. The essential point of the chapter is simple: to provide an 
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answer to the fundamental question of “what is the meaning of the term ‘firm’ and what do 
we know about the value of a firm?” Along with the detailed explanation, the author points 
to the central theme in major theories and concepts so that the reader can follow the theories 
and concepts when they are applied to business. Also, some important empirical papers are 
discussed throughout the chapter.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the author discusses the relevant concepts 
as they are presented to us and are used from the past up until current usage. What we have 
learnt after using this traditional theory for half a century is that the simple focus on single 
stakeholders creates some important problems that require attention with regard to the draw-
backs of the theories in the past. In the second part, the author illustrates the major problems 
arising from these traditional viewpoints of firm value theory and how the modern system of 
corporate finance can help us to solve this problem. The third part introduces the reader to a 
theory that challenges long-time traditional use of shareholders’ maximization theory (i.e., a 
theory whose main focus is only on a single group of stakeholders known as shareholders,); the 
more recent theory however focuses on a multifarious-group of stakeholders and is known 
as stakeholders theory. The author shows that stakeholders’ theory has been transformed into 
many versions of the current conceptualization-of-firm theory, such as sustainability con-
cepts, triple bottom lines, or the CSR theory.
2. The traditional conceptualization of a “firm”
In the early part of the nineteenth century, business units were owned by individuals or small 
groups of individuals. In this typical business unit, a firm was managed by an individual or 
assigned individuals who were appointed by an individual owner [9]. The problems of such 
private firms included the limitation in size and wealth of firm. This typical type of firm was 
owned and operated by a small group of people who had limited resources to expand and to 
manage the firm in the century in which business was becoming bigger and better [9]. More 
importantly, the continuity of typical single-owners or single-family firms was constrained 
by the geographical area where the owners or the groups of owners existed. This constraint 
curbed the size and wealth of a firm in that period.
The first paradigm shift in the conceptualization of a “firm” leads to the new architecture of 
“corporation,” through which its structure is designed to collect the wealth of individuals 
under a unified management and control system. This feature of corporations is known as 
“the separation of ownership and control” [9, 21, 53] implying the mechanism wherein own-
ers of a firm can be replaced without disturbing the control or management of a firm. The 
continuity of a firm is no longer contingent on the owner, or upon the geographical area of its 
founder. Moreover, this type of firm can obtain a huge amount of funds from its many and 
various shareholders, by collecting a small amount money from them. More importantly, a 
new empire or a huge conglomerate business has the possibility of being created through the 
activities of mergers and acquisitions, through which the activities require significantly large 
amount of money [8].
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Back in the 1960s, many researchers whose works related to the theory of firm or firm value 
cited the classic paper of Ronald Coase when they wrote about firm theory. Coase [21] was the 
Nobel Prize laureate in politics and economics and held the view that firms can be composed 
of many “nexus of contracts” or “nexus of parties” and, when there is a conflict of “prop-
erty rights,” parties within the nexus can bargain or negotiate terms that are more beneficial 
among them. In the nexus, the “Pareto efficient” is obtained by bargaining among the nexus. 
Coase’s theorem is therefore known as property right theory. The concept of a firm derived 
from Coase’s explanation is the springboard for many subsequent business and finance theo-
ries, including the classic paper, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and owner-
ship structure, of Jensen and Meckling [53].
Property right theory was defined as “separation of ownership and control” by Jensen and 
Meckling [53] and signified the separation of ownership and control that underlines the main 
nexus of firms into two groups. One is the group who has the property rights as the “own-
ers” of firms. The other one is the section of the management who has the right to operate or 
“control” firms. The relationship between the groups is called the principal-agent relation-
ship. Nexuses have many types of this kind of relationship, that is, the owners (principal) and 
management (agent), the shareholders and bondholders, or the minority shareholders and 
owners-managers.
In the standard contractual concept, shareholders offer money as capital to a firm in return 
for residual claims on returns of capital after money is paid to other groups. The attribute of 
the residual claim of shareholders is used to distinguish them from others. With this standard 
concept, it is clear that the shareholders are the group who provide capital to contribute to the 
overall operation of the firm. Even other groups, such as bondholders or preferred stockhold-
ers, can also provide some forms of capital to the firm, but they have no right to directly or 
indirectly control a firm. The standard argument holds that shareholders, with only residual 
claims, would bargain for corporate control in return for their residual risk bearers on the 
claims. Equipped with the power of corporate control, shareholders can assign control to 
their agents who will work in the firm so as to maximize benefit for them in returns. Clearly, 
this side of the theory is known as “shareholders theory” [11]. Viewed from the eyes of this 
separation, modern forms of firms have a lot of advantages as explained earlier, such as con-
tinuity, ample resources to expand the boundaries of a firm, and the independence of a firm’s 
site location and owners’ locations. Firm theory enjoys these advantages and applies them to 
the expansion of a given firm to harvest an industrial revolution. The theory also encourages 
owners to think in more revolutionary ways about their firms.
However, Jensen and Meckling [53] did not just describe the meaning of the term “firm” 
according to their own view. The great beauty of their work is in showing how we can exploit 
the fruitful nature of the concept of the “separation of ownership and control” as a magnifier 
to examine the peripheral events around a firm. They manage to fit the concepts very well 
with the overall business environment. Furthermore, the concepts can be used as heuristic 
tools for owners, managers, or any stakeholders to understand the causes and effects in rela-
tion to the value of firms and to understand the appropriate solutions for problems related to 
the principal-agent relationship. Problems arising from this relationship are known as agency 
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problems (see [30, 53]). The problems propose that whenever we have this relationship in the 
environment (not just in business), we are surrounded by the agency problem. Smith and 
Zsidisin [73, 74] used the agency framework to understand the trade-off involved in the selec-
tion of various approaches of student evaluation. The agency problem further proposes that 
it is not beyond reasonable expectation that both parties in the relationship have their own 
interests and incentives in order to maximize their own interests and wealth. It is this conflict 
of interest which is the root of the agency problem.
Traditional views of firms and the view of Jensen and Meckling or Coase still focus on the 
shareholders as the prime nexus or the most important group in the firm since they have the 
highest bargaining power in the firms as described earlier. To maximize the value of a firm, 
agents or managers need to put all resources into maximizing the value of the principal for 
the shareholders. Theoretically and according to the expected conflict of interest that might 
occur, the misalignment from the maximization of the value of a firm is generally found and 
hence reduces a firm’s value. Managers can allocate firm resources to benefit themselves in 
many ways such as to use a luxurious office or use expensive car(s) or other perks for their 
management position.
In the Enron case and in many other such cases, it was found that managers attempted to adjust 
financial statements for their own benefit. One important issue in accounting research is the 
extent to which managers alter reports to benefit themselves [7]. Empirical evidence shows 
that income-increasing earning management is more pervasive than income-decreasing earn-
ing management. Also, there is evidence that managers have incentives to increase income to 
hide any deterioration of performance [7]. Jensen and Meckling call the activities managers use 
to maximize their own wealth as “shirk” or “perquisite” or “perk,” through which these behav-
iors can directly and indirectly reduce a firm’s value. On the other side, (the point of view of the 
agent-principle relationship), any set of activities that reduce shirk or perk actually enhance the 
value of the firm. The demand for maximization of a firm’s value or of shareholders’ value calls 
for an effective set of activities that can be solved or can mitigate the agency problem.
2.1. Corporate governance
If the “shirk” or “perk” is not beyond the expectations or the principles of owners of the 
firm, they will formulate a set of mechanisms to control the deviation from shareholders’ 
wealth maximization. These take the form of “auditing” activities and monitoring activities. 
The auditing method is the inspection of managers through the prism of financial manage-
ment and has been used in business and accounting for a long time. However, the regular 
occurrence of fraudulent management in many firms demonstrates to us that the effectiveness 
of auditing activities alone cannot counter unethical business practices. Auditing is one set 
of activities designed by incumbent owners to monitor the behavior of managers. Issues of 
corruption, the rule of law, and legal enforcement demand a more effective set of monitoring 
activities, which have come to be known as corporate governance [68].
Corporate governance is defined as “a set of mechanisms through which outsider investors 
protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders.” Governance implementation can 
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be achieved by external mechanism (the market for corporate control) and internal mecha-
nism. The supreme objectives of corporate governance are set to ensure that shareholders 
as financiers get a return on their financial investment [71]. Corporate governance involves 
issues of practices to solve the complex issues among contract participants (social, employees, 
debt holders, and minority shareholders). However, the ultimate objective of corporate gover-
nance is still to focus on the wealth of the residual claimants who possess the highest bargain-
ing power in the firm. Empirical research on the issues of corporate governance around the 
word have major research questions, especially with regard to their effectiveness over firm 
performance, which are directly linked to shareholders [5, 59, 66, 68].
Renders and Gaeremynck [66] used a sample from 14 European countries and showed that 
governance within a high-quality disclosure environment leads to a higher firm value. Saona 
and Martin [68] used a sample from Latin American firms and assessed whether within coun-
try changes in governance and changes in ownership concentration can predict a change in 
the value of firms. The results are in contrast to expectations, that is in immature financial 
markets, (as found in Latin America), firms take advantage of both the asymmetries of infor-
mation and the multiple frictions in order to produce inflated valuations. These results cor-
relate with and confirm the expropriation of minority shareholders.
Further, as the financial system develops, firm values drop. Research in this field attempts to 
associate various factors with monitoring ability and test them on the relationship with firm 
value. Mayer [59] discussed the interaction between competition, ownership structure gover-
nance, and performance. The author shows that corporate systems across countries are differ-
ent and relate to ownership and the control of a firm (these variables are explained in the next 
section). Ownership concentration is higher in continental Europe and Japan than it is in the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America [59]. The next section provides an empirical 
test of some essential factors that are known to affect monitoring and hence affect firm value.
One set of the data regarding the governance system can be obtained from the effective 
board of directors. Board characteristics are directly a proxy for monitoring capability and 
are associated with firm value. Whole volumes of prior literature have discussed this topic 
([14, 32, 33, 50, 45, 57]). Compositions of board [1, 33, 49] studied in literature, include board 
size, board independence, and CEO entrenchment. The size of board or the number of 
directors on the board affect monitoring activities and henceforth can capture the level of 
corporate governance in a firm. A larger board size, it is argued, can lead to communication 
problems and higher agency problems. Free-rider problems from inert committees in large-
sized board rooms give rise to greater CEO power. Larger-board firms are expected to have 
lower monitoring costs [49]. Previous empirical studies have evidenced that board size is 
negatively correlated with a firm’s performance [1, 29, 38, 81].
Board independence and a higher percentage of independent directors tend to capture the 
monitoring capability of the board. Hence, it can be a proxy for the level of governance and it 
is used widely in literature in the area of board structure [13, 15, 23, 27, 62, 70, 78].
The diversity of board of directors also affects the capability to monitor and hence is fur-
ther associated with the overall firm value. Empirical evidence has shown that diversity can 
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improve a firm’s performance [1, 47]. The gender of executives is believed to be another factor 
that has improved board monitoring Adams and Ferreira [1] by adding “multiple diversity 
facets to the oversight lens” [57].
3. Ownership structure and monitoring system
Ownership structure can be explained in many formats. In one form, it can be viewed as a 
concentrated and well-dispersed ownership structure. Concentrated ownership structure is 
the form of ownership in which large shareholders exist and are able to monitor a manager’s 
activities in order to ensure the highest shareholder’s value. Dispersed ownership structure, 
on the other hand, is the structure of ownership in which shareholders are not large enough 
to form an active monitoring group themselves. Concentrated ownership is found mostly 
in countries where stock markets are not yet developed. Another structural view is that the 
activities of the company are the criteria used to justify whether the structure is concentrated 
or dispersed [5, 17, 58, 60]. Ownership structure is also classified by its use of a particular legal 
system in La Porta et al. [56]. Countries where common law is used to enforce the governance 
structure (found in the US and the UK) lead to a more dispersed form of structure. On the 
other hand, countries where civil law (found in France, Germany, or in emerging markets) 
is used to protect investors may lead to a more concentrated ownership structure, since the 
poorer protection afforded by civil law is substituted by the internal control system derived 
from the larger shareholders. Berle and Means [9] proposed that ownership concentration 
should have a positive effect on value because it reconciles the interests of managers to share-
holders. However, other researchers argue in opposite directions [25, 26].
Byun et al. [16] used data from the Korean stock market to explore the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value. They found that controlling shareholders through more 
direct ownership moderates the relationship between intensive board monitoring and firm 
value. In the US, Ajinkaya et al. [3] showed that firms with higher ownership concentration 
and higher institutional shareholdings are associated with stronger monitoring mechanisms. 
Previous research also argues that for any board with an entrenched CEO, monitoring capa-
bility will decrease because entrenched managers have greater bargaining rights, through 
which they can use their right to deviate firm resources to benefit their group [44]. Previous 
literatures have measured the entrenchment power of CEOs, using the situation when the 
CEO is the same person as the chairman of the board [13, 44]. Also, a CEO of long tenure is 
more likely to become entrenched [19].
One form of controlling shareholders is known as the family firm. A firm is regarded as a 
family firm if the shares of the company belong to either a single or a few families. In contrast, 
a widely held firm is the case in which shares of the company are held by many widespread 
investors. Many researchers have investigated the role of family firms on the firm value. 
Whether family firms improve or destroy the overall value of a firm is an interesting topic 
for researchers. Under the agency problem, large shareholders can expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders to their group. Or, they can divert resources of the firm in order to 
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facilitate a monitoring system that is tailored to their own requirements. The former hypoth-
esis regarding firm value is destroyed, while the latter hypothesis proposes that firm value 
should improve [77]. Evidence shows that owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more 
costly than a conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms [77].
4. Corporate social responsibility
After a long debate over the effectiveness of corporate governance, with the ultimate objective 
focusing on the wealth of shareholders, literatures have turned to ask questions about other 
stakeholders such as customers, social groups, or environmental lobbyists. Social pressures 
are the main driving forces of the strategic management in terms of both not only sharehold-
ers but also social issues too. The strategic management of many modern businesses includes 
the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of their strategic policy. CSR is also one attribute of 
corporate governance. However, researchers are still not clear about the benefit of CSR to 
shareholders.
In the context of the agency problem, managers of firms are inclined to invest for their own 
interests (i.e., for reputation) even in the cases of negative NPV projects. If an agency problem 
is manifested in the good policies (CSR in this case), the relative problem should be reduced 
when an efficient corporate governance mechanism is enforced.
If CSR is one attribute of corporate governance in terms of a tool to eliminate the agency 
problem and hence improve overall firm performance, one should observe the positive 
relationship between corporate governance and sustainability. Boghesi et al., [12] using the 
Governance Index or G-index as a proxy for the level of corporate governance in a firm (see 
[39]) find no relationship between the G-Index and the level of CSR. However, one may find 
that the level of CSR is higher for low insider firms (firms in which managers own a lower 
percentage of shares) and low institutional holdings. These findings suggest that investing 
in the CSR may not be due to the interest of shareholders but from the personal interest 
of managers. The theoretical implication from the agency problem is that if the CSR or 
other ethical policies are created in the service of a manager’s private benefit, then strong 
governance should reduce the CSR or other goodness policies ([2, 18, 41]; and [12]) In fact, 
the managerial ownership or the high institutional percentage of shares in a firm represents 
institutional pressure which, in the context of this chapter, may not have much involvement 
in explaining the firm’s investment in CSR activities. Thus, one could conclude that invest-
ment in CSR originates from the personal motivation of managers rather than from institutional 
force. Furthermore, findings about ownership structure and corporate governance are not 
consistent among different researchers. Barnea and Rubin [6] found a negative relationship 
between insider ownership and CSR, while Harjoto and Jo [41] found a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and CSR activities; however, Boghesi et al. [12] found the 
opposite relationship—firms with larger institutional ownership are negatively related to 
the CSR. From the perspective of these research findings, the CSR might not be the ideal 
solution for the alignment of the managers’ interests with the shareholders’ interests.
Firm Value
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Numerous empirical tests on the issue of the determinant factors of institutional ownership and 
governance structures are evidenced in many literatures that have been carried out over the 
last two decades. We provide some examples of the articles in the following section. Johnson 
and Greening [54] and Jansson [48] empirically found that companies with more pension funds 
representatives on the board perform better overall with the CSR. Siegel [72] showed that high-
skill labor firms are associated with a higher social sustainability performance. Turban and 
Greening [76] and Greening and Turban [40] evidence that high-quality workers are retained in 
high social sustainability performance firms. Unions in the firms are tested and hypothesized 
to affect corporate sustainability. Strong employees’ unions are found to be positively corre-
lated with high social sustainability performance [63].
Previous sections have shown some internal control mechanisms such as the ownership of 
shares, the number of analyst following, or the incentive compensation program. In this sec-
tion, the role of board characteristics is discussed to show that it is also used as an internal 
control mechanism in a firm ([14, 32, 33, 50, 45, 57]). The composition of the board of directors 
is studied by many researchers with regard to its relationship with the decision to invest in 
social programs (or the CSR).
Compositions of the board being studied [1, 33, 49] in literature include board size, board 
independence and CEO entrenchment. The size of board or the number of directors on the 
board affect monitoring activities and henceforth can capture the level of corporate gover-
nance in a firm. A larger board size is generally argued to have communication problems and 
a higher agency problem. Free-rider problems from inert committees in large-sized boards 
give rise to greater power to the CEO. Larger board firms are expected to have lower monitor-
ing costs [49]. Previous empirical studies have evidenced that board size is negatively related 
with a firms’ performance [1, 29, 38, 81].
Agency theory is the product of suspicious views over the relationship between principal and 
agent. The implication of this theory is that it is natural for owners and managers to foster 
interests in their own wealth rather than the firm’s wealth (or shareholders’ wealth). The 
agency relationship is under criticism because of the conflicting goals of the principle and 
the agents [24]. While agency theory views that conflicts of interests are not beyond expecta-
tion, the Stewardship theory offers the opposite view. Stewardship theory posits that managers 
are not opportunist nor commit to their duty for their own interest. Without any individual 
interests, board members can focus on strategic planning and on monitoring roles for the 
firms’ overall sake. These roles are more manifest when the board of directors imposes effec-
tive communication, collaboration, personal charisma, and networking. Moreover, the gender 
differences literature suggests that such qualifications are to be found more in women rather 
than men [20, 57]. Based on this theory, gender differences may play more vivid roles in 
producing managerial outcomes that differ from all-male boards only.
5. New challenges for firms
In the current environment, business structure has substantially changed and firms find 
themselves in different terrain from previous commercial paradigms. For example, there is 
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a more horizontal structure and firms are very close to their various stakeholders. The new 
structure is accelerated by the widespread fastening of social integration through information 
technology, as outlined brilliantly by Seidman [69].
This new circumstance changes the explanation on the theory of firms in many perspectives. 
Characteristics of these changes can be observed in two important concepts about the theory 
of firms. First, the value of firms no more concerns only the explicit relationship of various 
stakeholders such as shareholders and debt holders, but it incorporates the relationships 
which are the implicit ones to be included in the valuation function process.1 Second, not 
only a single group of stakeholders (shareholders) will receive their value at the maximum level 
from the firms’ operation, but many groups of stakeholders have their claims on part of the firm’s 
overall value [52]. Until the introduction of agency problems, finance theories explained many 
financial issues away by relying on the clear separation between participants. Effects from the 
decisions of any one group do not have any (or small) effect on decision of others. The separa-
tion of ownership and control assumes that inside equity owners or managers maximize the 
value of the firm without any constraints on or without any concerns about other outside non-
managerial shareholders’ objectives. Furthermore, firm theory has previously had nothing 
to do with other stakeholders’ desires. Stakeholders (customers, suppliers, community, etc.) 
were related to firms via the sole objective of profit maximization. In shareholders’ maximiza-
tion circumstance, only the cash flow to shareholders is taken into the valuation model by 
assuming that wealth of shareholders is created from sufficient returns without acknowledging 
or mentioning various returns to other stakeholders’ contributions.
This traditional approach to firm theory is challenged by researchers in many fields. 
Management theorists have now asserted that stakeholder theory has become the prominent 
theory instead of shareholder theory. The concepts of decision management beyond share-
holders’ value are welcome, such as the Customer Social Responsibility (CSR), the triple bot-
tom lines, the Economics Social Governance, or the Corporate Governance. Marketing theory 
has introduced the new paradigm of Maketing-3.0. Finance researchers have also incorporated 
these changes into the existing theories such as the firm’s value determination, the capital struc-
ture theory, and the theory of firms.
5.1. From shareholders to stakeholders
Shareholders’ theory and stakeholders’ theory are two opposing theories that view property 
rights differently. Traditional shareholders’ theory views shareholders as the only owners 
of the assets since they invest their money (capital) into the firm and they should therefore 
get the residual income to offset the risk from an operation. Traditional structure, therefore, 
assigns the right to shareholders who select the board to be their representatives. The board 
then selects the managerial team to operate a firm. Another perspective or stakeholders’ 
theory views that all stakeholders have their own rights with regard to their assets in a firm. 
Workers invest their human capital, customers and suppliers also contribute to a firm and 
should have their own claims on the part of the total income. Consumer co-operatives and 
1 Implicit relationship or implicit contracts are found in the relationships between nonmonetary stakeholders (social 
environment or community surrounding the organization, or environmental organizations).
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worker-cooperatives (or unions) are examples of organizations where consumers or workers 
explicitly get the shared income from an operation. Confliction in the two theories comes from 
the main disputed questions which turn out to be: Who should be the parties that have such 
“rights” on the asset or property and: Who has the authority to allocate the shared income? 
Jensen and Meckling [53], Ross [67], Quinn and Jones [64], Jensen [51] all argued in favor of 
shareholders maximization theory based upon the ideal that shareholders are essentially the 
principals who invest their explicit capital and delegate their managerial rights to managers 
or agents to operate the firm using the single objective to maximize the wealth of sharehold-
ers. By contrast, Freeman [34], Donaldson and Preston [28], Kay [55], Blair and Stout [10], and 
Freeman et al., [37] are researchers in favor of the stakeholders’ theory. Kay [55] argued that 
assets of the firms are in many forms and not just monetary capital provided by shareholders. 
Employees provide the skills, customers and suppliers’ the willingness to purchase and sell; 
additionally, a better understanding from societal groups around the firm is also an important 
asset that in terms of its returns, should be maximized. Kay explains that managers are the 
trustees of these assets.
Stakeholder theory is called an incomplete theory by Jensen. Jensen argues that stakeholder 
theory is incomplete because it does not offer a maximization of value for stakeholders. He 
also points out the flaw in the theory is that it does not provide a single-objective, so that 
the management cannot have a long-term goal under the stakeholder concept. However, he 
accepts that a stakeholders-oriented policy is needed to couple with the objective function and 
is labeled the “enlighten value maximization” policy. According to Boatright [11], stakeholder 
theory is not inconsistent with the nexus-of-contract view of firms, in which shareholders are 
held to be the only group that should be allowed to maximize their value. Boatright [11] rec-
onciled the theory of stakeholders and nexus-of-contract views and argues that stakeholder 
theory has the following perceptions: (1) all stakeholders have a right to participate in corpo-
rate decisions that affect them, (2) managers have a fiduciary duty to serve the interest of all 
stakeholder groups, and (3) the objective of the firm ought to be the promotion of all interests 
and not just those of shareholders alone. These three criteria are served as the essential con-
cepts to understand how value and stakeholders are related. It is not uncommon for all stake-
holders to participate in corporate decisions in this corporate governance structure. But, it is 
possible for some groups (employees or creditors) in some countries to have no such right [48].
6. Sustainability of a firm
According to the traditional concept, a firm is composed of contracts among interrelated 
groups within. The nexus-contract meaning of firms [4, 21, 32, 33, 53] views the value of firms 
as the value of explicit contracts among monetary stakeholders, such as shareholders and debt 
holders. Such meaning of the term “firm” is challenged by the increasing importance of non-
monetary and implicit stakeholders. From this perspective, values of firms can be increased 
because of the increasing value of implicit contracts [22, 75] and intangible assets [11, 51, 82]. 
Further, since each constituency can bargain with a firm over the effective means for protect-
ing its interests, value of firms can be increased (or decreased), when each constituencies’ 
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individual interest is satisfied [11]. Stakeholders’ theory and nexus-of-contract firms are 
aligned to each other because all stakeholders participate as contractors in the formation of a 
firm. In this view, the intrinsic value of each groups’ interest is the added value to a firm. As 
explained earlier by the author, the main normative clause from the nexus-of-contract theory 
is the agency theory, which posits that agency cost or agency problem is naturally occurring 
in the separation of ownership and controls [53]. Under the agency base theory, the value of 
a firm can be increased when agency costs are minimized. Agency theory focuses on explicit 
contractual relationships. Hill and Jones [46] and Boatright [11] proposed a new conceptual 
theory of agency-cost among stakeholder groups, which is called stakeholder-agency theory. 
Their model contends that stakes of constituencies or the various sizes of stakes are derived 
from the implicit contracts of the specific assets invested by stakeholders. By definition, spe-
cific assets means assets that cannot be redeployed to an alternative use without a loss of 
value [11, 46, 79, 80]. In this model, the relationship between manager and each stakeholder 
depends on such specific assets [11] and the power of difference between managers and stake-
holders [46].
Promotions in the job, a continuing production of handling quality products, or services to 
customers are examples of implicit contracts that can affect a firms’ value. As outlined by 
Williamson [79, 80]), Hill and Jones [46] and Boatright [11], human capital is an example of 
an intangible asset and is called on as a specific asset only if the human assets in the particular firm 
pose a unique skill to work within only that kind of business. Talented staffs with specific skill are 
usually found in the computer business or airlines business.
7. Stakeholders and sustainability
Corporate sustainability is a broad dialectical concept that combines economic growth with 
environmental protection and social equity. Originally, the term was used by the World 
Commission for Environment and Development or WCED in 1987, which defined sustain-
able development as development that met the needs of present generations without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their needs. The concept of sustainable development 
was originally created to enhance the implementation of macro-economic policy against the 
direction of country-development, which most countries often set in tandem with policies 
geared toward monetary growth (such as GDP). The concept has subsequently been used 
by businesses, who then labeled the term as “corporate sustainability” to differentiate from 
the macro-concept. Despite the lack of clarity as regards a working definition, there are still 
common concepts used to explain this term. The common concept usually documented is 
from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which is the nonprofit organization that works 
toward a sustainable global economy. From the viewpoint suggested by the GRI, corporate 
sustainability comprises three pillars: the economic performance, the environmental aspect, 
and the sociological performance.
The three pillars concept is very much well known in connection with the name of the triple 
bottom lines delineated by Elkington [31]. Corporate sustainability is almost identical to the 
triple bottom lines and many businesses use and interpret it as if they are utilizing the exact 
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self-same meaning. However, there are some different points that should be noted. The first 
point is the interpretation over the term “economic performance.” Triple bottom lines inter-
preted “economic” as accounting for the profit of firms, whereas the corporate sustainability 
concept describes economic performance more broadly than just accounting for the profit of 
firms in this limiting fashion. The second point of difference is the perception of value. While 
the triple bottom lines separate the value from the environmental and the social by implying 
that management has to indulge extra activities to enhance economic profit [43], the corporate 
sustainability theory states that value can be created when resource-suppliers (or stakehold-
ers) are maximized [43, 61].
The resource-based concept of corporate sustainability fits very well with the overall frame-
work of stakeholders’ theory [28, 34–36, 42], which has the main focus of sharing the value 
created in firms between all stakeholders—not just shareholders. As a consequence of this 
assumption, we use the terms “corporate sustainability” and “stakeholders” theory inter-
changeably in this chapter. Practically, it is very difficult to separate the sustainability strategy 
from a policy that is focused on the triple bottom lines theory.
8. Why sustainability?
Almost all corporations in the contemporary period voice their concerns regarding stakeholder 
groups beyond the realm of financial stakeholders (shareholders and creditors). Customers, 
employees, and suppliers are all targets of concerns since they are groups who interact and 
have a direct influence upon a firm’s operation and profitability. More extrinsic stakeholders 
such as social groups, community groups, or environmental activists are indirectly affected 
by a firm’s operations—but they are also targeted. As indicated in stakeholders’ theory, a 
business’s operation in the current business climate cannot be sustained if their stakeholders 
are not satisfied.
Corporate sustainability is not just a new concept in management theory—but the concept 
has been proposed and discussed by economist for a few decades now. The questions as to 
why it is needed for current business strategies can be evidenced by many concrete dem-
onstrations and by the work of many academicians. In general, corporate sustainability or 
stakeholder theory has become the prominent theory because the conventional theory, which 
emphasizes on a single group of stakeholders or stockholders, is not sufficient to explain 
the vagaries of the current business climate. Business in this current environment of high 
and effective internet communication has lowered its wall against outside influences. Their 
policies or practices are exposed to stakeholders who are more collective in voicing their 
demand against unjustified policies or unfair policies. There are many business cases which 
aptly demonstrate how businesses are in a situation of turmoil when stakeholders’ welfare 
requirements are not satisfied. For example, the case of Nike in the middle of the 1990s where 
a transnational was blamed for the use of child labor in Pakistan; in addition, “KFC” has been 
the target of criticism for its use of trans-fat in its operations. In 2009, W.R. Grace and Company 
the Maryland-based chemical conglomerate had a case filed against if for exposing workers 
and residents to asbestos contamination in Libby, Troy, and Montana. The case has been the 
subject of a film entitled “A Civil Action.” These cases are all good examples of businesses that 
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got into trouble when their practices adversely affected various stakeholders, both extrinsic 
and intrinsic. In fact, their practices and standards did not meet the required ethical standards 
of a wide range of stakeholders.
Zingales [82] described the changing characteristics of modern firms by claiming that:
“The nature of the firms is changing. Large conglomerates have been broken up, and their units have 
been spun off as stand-alone companies. Vertically integrated manufacturers have relinquished direct 
control of their suppliers and moved toward looser forms of collaboration. Human capital is emerging 
as the most crucial asset.”
9. Conclusion
The developmental learning of firm theory through its history is akin to what Isaac Newton 
(1675) alluded to when he claimed If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants. 
If we imagine the theory of firm value as a ride on a long journey, we can see a lot of changes 
along the way. Along the journey, the view from one side of the road is clearly different from 
that on the other side of the road. It moves from one belief in the theory of shareholders to the 
other side, or the emphasis upon stakeholders. Firm theory has to address these vacillations 
in financial knowledge. Zingales turns the spotlight onto the future of finance, when he writes 
that the new theory of finance should understand the relative effects of mergers, acquisitions, 
spin-offs, and diversification under the aegis of these new theoretical changes. In these new 
and changing circumstances, the concept of corporate governance must be addressed in order 
for it to develop a new system to cope with these new market environments [65, 82].
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